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ABSTRACT 
Even though the emotional state is increasingly taken into 
account in scientific studies aimed at determining user 
experience of user acceptance, there are still only a few 
normalized tools. In this article, we decided to focus on 
mood determination as we consider this affective state to be 
more pervasive and more understandable by the person who 
is experiencing it. Thus, we propose a prototypical tool 
called SYM (Spot Your Mood) as a new tool in user mood 
determination to be used in many different situations. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Since Aristotle and the Greek philosophers, the question of 
the affective state has stayed central and very questioned in 
most areas of science. With the emergence of psychology 
and other cognitive sciences, the subject seems to be even 
more unavoidable. The constructivist paradigm, by putting 
the person in the very center of the sense-making process, 
collaterally brings the question of the influence of his 
affective state to the table [1]. 
Even though the subject has been treated over hundreds of 
years, it is quite noticeable that it still suffers from a lack of 
consensus and sometimes a lack of recognition in most 
technical areas. Actually, there is a lot of confusion; most 
terms and concepts are ill-defined and they often cannot 
escape from the epistemic posture of authors.  
In this article, we decided to work on the mood concept that 
is indisputably less "fashionable" that the emotion concept. 
We put forward that mood is, however, a central parameter 
of the whole configuration of mental activity. Having said 
that, the question of knowing about the mood of the person 
or the population we are studying in an experimentation 
cannot remain unanswered, it has to be studied as a 
potential parameter of the experimental situation in order 
not to become a bias. Thus, after disambiguating as best as 
possible the concept of mood, we propose a protocol and a 
prototypical tool intended to solve that question. 
DETERMINATION OF AN AFFECTIVE STATE 
Why mood? 
When taking into account the emotional state (as opposed 
to traits we are not talking about here) in determining its 
effect on reasoning or decision making, we first need to 
disambiguate which affective concept fits the most with 
user experience considerations.  
Empirically, when confronted with some experience, 
listening to music, visiting a museum and so on, a person 
induces a change in his actual affective state. Nonetheless, 
the qualification of this affective state is still quite fuzzy. 
Generally, in the literature, we can find three main concepts 
that are sometimes mixed up: "affect", "mood" and 
"emotion". 
First, "affect" seems to be a portmanteau word, a concept 
embodying "mood", "emotion", "feelings", etc. There is, at 
the same time, confusion with the word "affect" in itself. As 
used in the expression "affective state", it refers to a state, 
an immediate emotionally "colored" cognitive state, but, the 
word can also be used to qualify feelings in the most 
sensitive signification. Then, as "affect" appears to be a 
supra-concept covering different ill-defined infra-concepts, 
we have to rely on another. 
The concept of emotion, even if it is the most commonly 
encountered in the literature, also seems to be the fuzziest. 
In fact, more than 30 years ago, Kleinginna and Kleinginna 
were able to point out more than one hundred different 
definitions [2]. By researching for this communication we 
noticed over two hundred definitions that are not 
compatible: 38% of these consider emotions as being a 
physiological phenomenon while 62% consider them as 
being a psychological one. This lack of consensus brings 
about most of the misunderstandings we can notice in the 
literature. Nevertheless, there is some agreement; in most 
definitions "emotion" refers to a response to some internal 
or external stimulation of short-term duration and quite 
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strong effects on the behavior. Thus, emotions are seen as 
being intentional (associated to an object or a stimulus) and 
transient. By looking again in the literature (the articles in 
which we found the definitions, which numbered over 200) 
we could see that a third of the statements we found 
considered that emotions are inaccessible to the conscious 
mind, versus two thirds which advocated the opposite. To 
us, emotion seems to be, most of the time, a "qualia-like" 
phenomenon being analyzed as a part of the information 
available in order to copy with the situation. The flow of 
data of a physiological nature (heart rate, blood pressure, 
etc.) or psychological nature (feelings) is melted into the 
rest of the sensitive and cognitive information during the 
experience. That implies that emotions are too volatile, too 
transient and not stable on a macroscopic time scale. 
According to Sloboda [3], emotions are "rather 
unmemorable on average";even though this statement looks 
polemical, it is still possible to agree to with it despite some 
reservation. Strong reciprocal links between emotions and 
memory have been shown from the recording to the reading 
of the information, and these cannot be denied [24-26]. 
However, and in accordance with Sloboda's statement it is 
not the emotional experience in itself that is recorded or 
recalled. We can remember about contextual cues, ongoing 
actions (like in the Ziegarnik's effect [27]) and about the 
consequences of the experience. We do record/recall the 
initial setup (initial mood, environment, etc.), the perturbing 
element, and the final setup (consequences, final mood,..) 
with some kind of an emotional label on it which is like the 
very source of feelings such as nostalgia for example [28]. 
Body feelings, sensations, etc. are, to a large extent, lost as 
it is for any "qualia-like" phenomenon. 
So, in an attempt, like ours, to try to characterize the 
affective experience of a person, they constitute a cul-de-
sac. 
As a consequence, our epistemology has to be built on the 
last commonly encountered concept: the "mood". The 
concept is sometimes considered as being old fashioned, 
especially in its French translation "humeur". Even if we 
could notice up to 88 different statements in the literature, 
chronologically from Weld [4] to Juslin and Sloboda [5], 
there is more agreement between authors.  
Hence, the mood stands for a state, at a given time, in a 
given situation, that is linked to the framework of the whole 
organism by the attention given to its sense-making and 
cognitive processes [6], [7]. Thus, mood is seen as the 
psycho-physiological substratum of any situation; whenever 
we are in a certain situation - in other words, all the time - 
we are in a certain mood [8] (very similar to Heidegger's 
concept of "stimmung" [9]) even though we are only able to 
be conscious of that state if we focus our attention on it. 
Mood can be seen as a relatively stable and pervasive setup 
that can be maintained from minutes to days. Without a 
perturbing element, a mood can be sustained or can slowly 
decay to a more "stable" one. We can draw a quick analogy 
with a homeostatic state in the chemical sciences. In the 
attempt of Lane and Terry to give a theoretical basis to the 
concept of mood, they put forward that it is "a set of 
feelings, ephemeral in nature, varying in intensity and 
duration, and usually involving more than one emotion" 
[8]. In this context, emotions can then be seen as the 
perturbing elements we were talking about. This posture is 
compatible with the fact that emotions are quasi-
inaccessible in themselves to the cognitive process. In our 
opinion, it is the mood and the difference between a pre-
stimulation and a post-stimulation mood that are accessible 
to the cognitive process. 
How to measure/represent mood? 
That being said, there is still a central question to answer: 
how to measure mood and how to represent it in a 
sufficiently efficient and communicable way? Following on 
from what we just said, we can put as a working hypothesis 
that we are trying to characterize an affective experience in 
a certain situation by looking at the mood and at its 
evolution during this situation. Although emotions are not 
accessible, we still can notice the "dents" they produce on 
the mood.  
So, we need to follow the evolution of an internal parameter 
of the visitor / listener / spectator. Nevertheless, to follow 
an evolution, we need to characterize differences. In fact, 
we need to find information about the quasi-homeostatic 
affective state at the beginning of the experience we want to 
study and, a minima, the final one. Thus, the difference 
between the two "measures" would be analogous to a kind 
of integrative view of the affective experience.  
But, that does not answer the "how to" question. At that 
time, we have to choose between two epistemic points of 
view which are opposite to each other. On one hand, many 
psychologists and scientists put forward that it is possible to 
measure some affective phenomenon by looking at 
physiological reactions like micro-expressions [10] or 
heart-rate[11]. On the other hand, we can emphasize 
Barrett's statement saying: "for better or worse, self-report 
represents the most reliable and possibly only window that 
researchers have on conscious, subjective emotional 
experience." [12] 
Taking a look at Mugur-Schächter's works on theorizing the 
qualification and measuring process [13], [14], we would 
preferably agree with Barrett. Actually, to qualify implies to 
measure and to measure implies a measuring tool. 
Whatever we are trying to qualify, we first need to build a 
link to it starting from the conscious process. Something 
from the outside of our body will then be measured 
throughout our biosensors, our attention and our cognition. 
Something from the inside of our body will be measured 
throughout our attention to it and our cognition.  
But it seems common grounded that affective phenomena 
like mood are both internal and external phenomena from a 
conscious point of view. Consequently, looking for 
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somebody else's mood by looking at physical or 
physiological variation is like erasing a big part of the 
information. The only person able to collect information 
from the situation and from its inner world is then the 
person living the experience.  
Nevertheless, that statement does not totally disqualify 
physiological measures like heart-rate. Actually, heart-rate 
variability can be a useful additive signal that can constitute 
a highly profitable source of information. 
Asking for the mood 
If the person is in the best position to determine his mood, 
we now have to ask him for it. According to Shannon's 
theory of information, a transmitter and a receiver have to 
speak (at least) the same language to code and decode the 
message. That is why spoken or written language appeared 
to be a good idea at their origin. 
But, as we were able to notice during previous 
experimentation, verbalization is not the easiest way to 
study affective response when listening to music [15]. 
Actually, in an experiment we asked for people to qualify 
the mood of a musical excerpt using adjectives. We wanted 
to test an open-ended condition in order to estimate 
personal judgment about the music expressed in their own 
language. 
The supra-context of the experiment was to try to establish 
a minimal set list of mood adjectives in order to use them as 
the standing ground for indexing and searching for the 
musical excerpt in an online library (the reason why we 
needed to have the mood expressed in the user's own 
language). In this context, the qualifier has to reach a 
certain threshold of consensus in order to be meaningful. 
Due to the impressive quantity of different adjectives we 
gathered, we then decided to build up some semantic 
proxemy analysis so as to meet an inter-subjective 
agreement. 
In this attempt, we discovered that there was agreement to a 
certain degree. Actually, most of the terms seemed to 
coincide with a main idea as they were, for the most part, 
synonyms. But we could also notice that there was some 
confusion. Indeed, there appeared to be a discrepancy 
between the personal mood of the person and an extra-
personal mood designating the excerpt. That sounds logical 
to say that in the musical signal there is no mood, only a 
living person can endure such an affective state, but when 
submitted to a stimulus able to induce or to produce 
emotions, a person is able to assign an emotional content to 
that stimulus. At that moment, there can be confusion 
between a "personally-felt" mood and a "perceived" one 
[16], [17].  
The results of this experiment brought us to develop a new 
protocol to deal with the issues of verbalization and 
confusions between moods. 
SYM: SPOT YOUR MOOD 
Getting over the verbalization problem is a big issue. In the 
context of our first experiment, deleting the massive set of 
qualifiers would represent a more efficient tagging process 
resulting in a better indexation. Thus, we decided to rely on 
some graphical expression and representation systems to 
assess for the mood. Like in the Self-Assessment Manikin 
[18] or in the Geneva Emotion Wheel [19] everything starts 
with the use of dimensional theory of emotion and the 
valence-arousal space notably developed by Russell [20] 
and Thayer [21].The valence dimension consists in a 
hedonic value of pleasantness / unpleasantness and the 
arousal dimension is relative to a psycho-physiological 
wakefulness. According to Russell, every possible affect is 
representable by a set of two values in those dimensions.  
The SAM allows the user to give information about his 
emotional state through valence, arousal and 
control/potency (the last is not always represented) discrete 
10-step-Likert-scales. The GEW consists in a flower of 
circles representing the emotional universe cut into discrete 
families of emotions. Both give a discrete representation of 
the mood space. In our approach, we decided to stay more 
faithful to the dimensional approach described by Russell.  
Thus, we directly present a valence-arousal space to the 
user and ask him to express his mood throughout one or 
many points. In our representation, the valence dimension is 
the abscissa axis and the arousal is the ordinate axis. 
Extrema are then characterized with smileys representing 
high valence, low valence, high arousal and low arousal in 
order to avoid verbal influence. 
 
Figure 1 : SYM's Valence-Arousal diagram 
Until then, the user is free at any time to designate a point 
on the figure to give us information on mood. We let the 
user have the impression of a continuous scale, however the 
indications are digitally stored in the discretized interval[-
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100;100][-100;100]. The software architecture is a 
traditional client-server routine, but the idea is to allow the 
researcher to use plug-ins such as indoor localization or 
synchronization with audio or video, depending on the 
experimental needs.  
Also, the major utility of SYM is to provide a dynamic 
dictionary of emotional states linked to valence-arousal 
locus. This dictionary consists in a database, which links 
nouns, verbs, adverbs and expressions related to the same 
emotional concept. With semantic proxemy analysis 
between the terms, it is possible to also link some emotional 
states in order to create a kind of net.  
The user spots a mood which is represented as a couple of 
(x,y) coordinates. These coordinates are transmitted to a 
server, which interrogates a data-base and finds the 3 
closest mood terms and sends them to the client. If the user 
is satisfied, the server stores the tuple (x, y, word). If not, 
the process is the same, excepting the last words refused by 
the client. Doing that, SYM can be seen as a verbalization 
helper. As we were able to notice during previous 
experimentations, it is quite hard to express clearly how we 
feel when asked to do so. Moreover, direct verbalization 
also presents polysemic issues and the use of adjectives that 
a computer cannot disambiguate.  
Here, as every situation can lead to the usage of the same 
words with different meanings, a section of the master 
dictionary can be set up to fit the expression of the users. 
Also, some words will not be used on some occasions. For 
example, you will rarely find "anger" expressed as a 
musical mood. Thus, with the help of some specialists, for 
example in museography, we can determine the terms that 
would fit or not to the situation, then generating custom 
dictionaries. These custom dictionaries bring more 
simplicity for the user, avoiding "noise words" being 
proposed while spotting on the diagram. 
Periodically, the server makes a separate update of the 
position of words on the valence-arousal based on the 
user’s feedback, to include the folksonomy generated 
throughout the different experimentations. As a result, the 
dictionary used for each setup is a part of the master 
dictionary with custom placements of the mood words 
regarding the conditions.  
This function allows us to make a difference for the usage 
of words, which can differ for certain activities (shopping, 
cultural exhibitions,…) or within different populations 
(street language, rich language, etc.). 
The architecture permits us to use the client terminal or to 
visualize in a browser the results of the experiments, placed 
on the diagram for each user or in a cloud of points. The 
raw data can also be imported as .csv files on any statistics 
software for treatment and synchronization with 
physiological signals or experiment props (music, video…) 
 
Figure 2 : SYM simplified workflow 
MOOD SPOTTING 
A validation of mood spotting on Valence-Arousal 
space 
The usage of a valence-arousal space with a similar 
approach can be found on the experiments led by Fanny 
Bougenies during her PhD thesis [23]. The protocol was 
using it to assess the emotional state of about 130 children 
with or without deficiencies (deaf, mental impairment, 
autism…) before and after a visit to a museum. Each of 
them was given a tablet with an educational software 
program designed to enhance their visit. At that time, 
valence-arousal graphs were paper-made and consisted in a 
part of the questionnaire. 
The conclusions showed that not a single child endured 
difficulties understanding, they managed to use the diagram 
without indications. Moreover, it allowed autistic children, 
generally not willing to talk much, to express their emotions 
smoothly. 
The problem was that all these indications were taken on a 
calibrated sheet of paper. It meant precise measurement, 
normalization and reporting on a computer (with a 
computer-aid design software) to get a usable corpus of 
data. This underlined the necessity of finding an appropriate 
computerized workflow to gather and process the moods. 
Mood spotting for determining visitor experience in 
museum exhibition 
The testing experimentation was focused on the ability of 
the interface to be used by the public without altering their 
experience with a significant impact. It took place in the 
“Musée des Beaux-Arts” of Lille in France. The visitors 
wanting to visit the museum were offered a free pass just 
before the act of payment for their tickets, but they were 
required to be equipped with eye-tracking glasses and a 
tablet with an android version of SYM. At any time, they 
could spot their mood on the device. For 50% of them, a 
word was also provided to qualify their mood, based on the 
point they spotted, which they had to validate or not. After 
their visit, they were shown their field of view during their 
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visit (from the eye-tracking glasses) and were asked to 
describe their experience. 
The result was that all of the interviewees were able to spot 
their mood easily, and without any long explanations of the 
system. Also, the impressions and comments given after the 
visit correlated with the tuples (x, y, word) spotted on the 
application. If not as precise as a full interview after the 
experiment, the SYM approach was able to give the shape 
of the experience of the visitor just as the affective state 
shapes the user experience. This could be the first step of an 
evaluation protocol to distinguish the points in the 
exhibition that have issues. 
CONCLUSION 
SYM was originally designed as a "verbalization" helping 
tool when it comes to expressing mood. Even if we are still 
prototyping the tool in itself, we managed to build a 
complete integrative workflow that we are still amending. 
The experiment we presented showed us that SYM was 
very efficient as a non-pervasive experimental protocol 
when inquiring about affective states. 
The participants were only told to spot their mood at the 
beginning and at the end of the visit and then were free, for 
the rest of time, to inform us or not about their state of 
mind. This results in a very small probability of being 
exposed to the social desirability bias [22] which could be 
feared as we penetrate into the very private area of affective 
states.  
Before the experiment took place, we had already noticed 
the efficiency of pre-SYM attempts. In a still unpublished 
study about qualifying music throughout mood spotting, we 
noticed that the listeners were able to understand the 
diagram at a glance and give a point for their mood.  
We also noticed that users were able not to mistake between 
their own mood and the musical one. Actually, in order not 
to fall into this trap, we decided to inquire into their mood 
before and after the listening and about the "musical" mood 
during the listening. It is interesting to see that there is no 
possible inter-personal common-ground about the own-
mood (nor about its evolution) although we can recognize a 
certain degree of convergence for the inter-personal musical 
moods. That can be seen as a successful distinction between 
the personal and the musical mood. Furthermore, that gave 
us two interesting pieces of information about the music; on 
one hand, the difference between the beginning and the end 
of the experiment related to the emotional effect of the 
music and, on the other, a mood assigning for the 
"emotional content" of the musical excerpt in itself. 
Admittedly, SYM is still a prototype and it needs to be 
improved and amended to fit the different experimental 
setups, nevertheless, according to the first results we had in 
the field, SYM can open new perspectives in user mood 
determination. 
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